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6.1  Introduction 
The difficulties of reforming international institutions and practices at the 
global level provide increasingly powerful impetus for regional economic ar- 
rangements. Readers hardly need to be reminded of the prominence of ASEAN 
and APEC in Asia and the Pacific or of NAFTA and MERCOSUR in the Amer- 
icas, to list but a few of  the familiar acronyms. Of  these arrangements, the 
European Union is the one with the most far-reaching implications. It is the 
most long lived; in  1997 the Treaty of Rome will turn 40 and the European 
Union will have reached middle age. Having started life as a customs union 
(and  an  atomic  energy  consortium), the  European  Economic Community 
(EEC), as it was initially known, created a regional mechanism for limiting 
exchange rate flexibility in the 1970s and established an integrated internal 
market throughout which goods, services, capital, and labor could flow in the 
1990s. The Maastricht Treaty negotiated in  1991 provides a framework for 
the creation of a single European currency, a European Central Bank, and the 
harmonized social and fiscal policies regarded as concomitants. 
Observers in other parts of the world thus have good reason to look to Eu- 
rope in order to gauge the possible future evolution of their own regional ar- 
rangements or, for that matter, to identify distinctive features of their own inte- 
gration processes. In this paper we take a step toward providing the historical 
perspective they  require by  reviewing the impact of  regionalism in Europe. 
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Since a customs union was the EEC's first economic initiative, trade creation 
and diversion are the logical starting points. 
The gravity model has long been the workhorse for empirical studies of the 
pattern of trade. As in the Newtonian  equation after which it is named, at- 
traction (trade) depends on mass (the product of economic size) and distance 
(geographic or economic).'  Specifically, the  volume of  trade between  two 
countries should increase with their real GDPs (the so-called gravity variable), 
since large countries should trade more than small ones, and with per capita 
incomes, since rich countries should trade more than poor ones. It should di- 
minish with geographical distance because proximity reduces transportation 
and information costs. Since the dependent variable in the gravity model is 
bilateral trade between pairs of countries, each variable (other than distance) 
is entered in product form. Investigators then add dummy variables for partici- 
pation in various preferential arrangements (Hamilton and Winters 1992;  Fran- 
kel and Wei 1993). If one finds a positive coefficient on a dummy variable 
indicating that two countries participate in the same trading agreement, indi- 
cating that these countries trade more with one another than predicted by their 
incomes and distance, then the conclusion drawn is that the arrangement is 
trade creating for its members. If there is a negative coefficient on a dummy 
variable indicating that only one member of the pair participates in a particular 
preferential arrangement, this is taken as evidence of trade diversion vis-8-vis 
the rest of the world.2 
Results obtained using this approach can be questioned on several grounds. 
One is that the coefficients on dummy variables for subgroups of countries will 
pick up all respects in which those countries differ in their trade performance 
that are not controlled for in the gravity equation. To take an example pursued 
by  Frankel and Wei  (1993), if all the countries in a region have a common 
language, then including a dummy variable for that region but not a measure 
of language will tend to spuriously attribute the effects of the shared language 
in encouraging economic links to commercial policy measures. More gener- 
ally, dummy variables for preferential arrangements serve as catch basins for 
omitted factors. There is an analogy with early regression studies of the union 
wage premium in which a dummy variable for union membership was simply 
added to the wage equation, encouraging the attribution to unionization of the 
wage effects of unobserved heterogeneity among workers. 
Related to this is the difficulty of measuring economic distance independent 
of the trade flows that the investigator seeks to explain. The underlying theory 
appeals to transactions costs to trade, and in  empirical implementation  it is 
posited that such costs should rise with distance. But economic and geographic 
1. See Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985). Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995) have provided a 
discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the model. 
2. This approach, which we also adopt, takes economic growth within the Community as given. 
It therefore ignores any benefits to the rest of  the world from greater prosperity within Europe 
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distance are not the same. Insofar as economic distance is mismeasured, its 
effects may be loaded into the dummy variables intended to capture the effects 
of regionalism (Bayoumi 1993). 
A further problem with the gravity model is the omission of third-country 
effects. It is generally assumed that bilateral trade depends only on economic 
conditions in the two countries considered. In practice, however, bilateral trade 
will also depend on competitiveness relative to other countries and markets. 
More generally, insofar as economic variables in third countries affect trade 
flows between other country pairs, gravity equations suffer from omitted- 
variables bias. 
A final problem arises from the practice of pooling data for industrial and 
developing countries. While this maximizes degrees of freedom, the relation- 
ship between trade and economic characteristics may  vary between the two 
groups of  countries. The income elasticity of  trade may be different at high 
and low levels of income or for different types of goods, for example. Transac- 
tions costs may have very different structures in countries with more and less 
articulated markets. Results based on heterogeneous cross sections may there- 
fore suffer from subsample instability and heteroscedasticity. 
In this paper we develop and implement an approach designed to meet these 
concerns. Our main focus is on a specification that, while compatible with the 
basic theory, departs from the standard model in important ways. We  estimate 
our equation in differences rather than levels; thus, unobserved heterogeneity 
across countries that is constant over time will not contaminate our results. (To 
return to the analogy with the literature on  the union wage premium, recent 
studies use panel data to estimate the wage equation in first-difference form, 
identifying the effects of unionism on the basis of the differential change in 
wages for workers whose union status has changed. Following the same work- 
ers minimizes the problems created by forms of unobserved heterogeneity that 
are constant over time. The same is true of our differenced gravity specifica- 
tion; it eliminates omitted-variables  bias due to time-invariant sources of unob- 
served heterogeneity.) We  augment the specification to include the real ex- 
change rate vis-a-vis the United States to control for third-country effects. We 
limit our sample to 21 industrial countries to reduce the danger of conflating 
distinct industrial and developing country effects; it is the fact that the resulting 
sample is heavily European that leads us to focus on the European Community 
and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). And we analyze successive 
cross sections as a way  of  identifying differences over time in the trade- 
creating and trade-diverting effects of European regionalism. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes the data 
and specification used in our empirical analysis. Section 6.3 reports and dis- 
cusses the results. Section 6.4 provides comparisons with other studies and 
presents our own results using the standard gravity formulation. Section 6.5 
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6.2  Data and Specification 
The typical gravity model specification relates bilateral trade to income, 
population (or per capita income), and distance between the trading partners: 
(1) 
where TRADE,, is bilateral trade between countries i andj  at time t (measured 
in U.S. dollars), Y is real income (the so-called gravity variable), P is popula- 
tion, and DIST is distance. As trade is expected to increase with size and per 
capita income and to decline with distance, B, should be positive, B,  and B, 
negative. 
We  estimate this equation after adding a measure of  the deviation of  the 
exchange rate from purchasing power parity (PPP). One of  the difficulties in 
measuring economic size across countries is that exchange rates appear to de- 
viate from the values implied by the relative prices of goods, and it is unclear 
whether output should be measured in terms of current exchange rates or their 
PPP counterparts. Market rates measure current buying power more accurately. 
However, PPP rates provide a better measure of relative living standards. This 
is particularly true for the industrial countries, where recent research indicates 
a tendency for exchange rates to revert to PPP over the long term., And it is not 
clear whether the gravity term in equation (1) is properly based on a measure of 
income or wealth. In our specification, real output is measured at PPP levels 
and a term in the product of deviations of both exchange rates from PPP was 
added, resulting in the following equation: 
log(TRADE,,,) = a + B, log(Y,Y,J + B,  lOg(e,q + B,  (DIST,,), 
(1')  WTRADE,,?) = a + B,log(Y,Y,) + B,l~g(e,~,) 
+ B,(DIST,)  + B,log(R,, R,,), 
where R, is country i's real exchange rate vis-8-vis the United States and other 
variables are defined as above. 
Our alternative specification also uses bilateral trade data but focuses on 
changes over time: 
(2)  dlog(TRADEE,,)  = a + B, dlog(Y,Y,,) 
+ B,  dlog(4, 4,) + 4 dlog(R*,  R,,), 
where d is the difference operator. Variables like DIST that are constant over 
time drop out of  this specification. In the tradition of the gravity model, we 
add dummy variables for membership in preferential arrangements with the 
objective of analyzing their trade-creating and trade-diverting effects. 
Equation (2) has several advantages. First, to the extent that economic dis- 
3. This is less true of a comparison of developing and industrial countries, where exchange rates 
appear to consistently deviate from PPP values due to differences in productivity between traded 
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tance and other, unobserved country characteristics influencing the volume of 
trade are constant over time, problems related to their measurement or omis- 
sion will not bias our results. Second, including the change in the real exchange 
rate allows us to analyze third-country effects. If the dollar falls against both 
currencies, then trade between other countries in terms of dollars will tend to 
rise. If the rise in the dollar value of trade is proportional, then B, in equation 
(2) will equal 0.5 (this is because the term is the product of  both  exchange 
rates). If dollar depreciation causes some trade to be diverted to other coun- 
tries, then B, < 0.5. Finally, the constants in equation (2) shed light on the 
relationship between  trade and growth. If the constant is small, this implies 
that trade and output grow proportionately.  If  the constant term is negative, 
then trade expands more than proportionately with changes in output, and con- 
versely if the constant term is po~itive.~ 
We collected annual data on bilateral trade flows among 21 industrial coun- 
tries from the machine-readable version of the International Monetary Fund's 
Direction of  Trade Sfatisticx5  The data cover the years 1953-92  and were con- 
verted to constant dollars using the U.S. GDP deflator.6 Real GDP and devia- 
tions of the exchange rate from PPP (which were also used to measure changes 
in the real exchange  rate in our alternative approach) were drawn from the 
Penn-Wharton World Tables.' We averaged three years of successive, nonover- 
lapping annual figures to construct our data set. While it would have been pos- 
sible to estimate the model using the annual data themselves, business cycle 
effects would have dominated the analysk8 
We divided the sample into three overlapping periods: that of the formation 
of the EEC and EFTA (1956-73);  that when the EEC was expanded to include 
the United  Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark and when the remaining EFTA 
countries concluded trade agreements  with the  Community  (1965-80);  and 
that when the Community was enlarged to include Greece, Portugal, and Spain 
(1975-92).  We constructed each period so that it began just prior to the events 
4.  Eiq. (2) does have an important disadvantage. When the gravity model is estimated in levels, 
it predicts the level of trade. When the rate of change specification is used, it is only possible to 
analyze whether trade is growing faster or slower than expected. 
5. The countries were the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia, Austria, BelgiumLuxembourg, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, the Nether- 
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
6.  The U.S. GDP deflator rose nearly  1 percent per annum faster than the export deflator over 
the period. This should be borne in mind in interpreting the constant terms. 
7. In the alternative approach we experimented with various methods of calculating the real 
exchange rate. As they made little difference, we chose to use the PPP values. Distances between 
major cities, which were needed for the traditional gravity model, were obtained from U.S. Air 
Force Aeronautical Charts for bilateral links in which one or both countries were outside of Eu- 
rope, and from Rand McNally otherwise. Hence, distances within Europe were measured in terms 
of distances by road, those outside in terms of air miles. 
8. Three-year averaging was a compromise between the desire to focus on secular rather than 
cyclical effects and the wish to distinguish as many separate periods as possible. We also experi- 
mented with four- and five-year averages, which in practice yielded very similar results. 146  Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen 
Table 6.1  Results from Traditional ‘‘Level’’ Gravity Model and from “Rate of 
Change” Version 
Variable  Level of Trade  Change in Trade 
Log of GDPs at PPP 
Log of populations 
Log of  deviations from PPP 















Implied percentage reduction in trade 
due to time dummies (percent per 
annum) 
R2 
1.39  (.03)** 
-0.66  (.03)** 
0.58 (.06)** 
-0.77  (.01)** 
-1.44  (.51)** 
-0.14  (.08) 
-0.29  (.08)** 
-0.50  (.08)** 
-0.71  (.08)** 
-0.85  (.08)** 
-0.99  (.09)** 
-  1.08 (.09)** 
-1.19  (.lo)** 
-1.16  (.09)** 
-1.18  (.09)** 
-1.37  (.lo)** 




-1.12  (.17)** 
0.38 (.04)** 
-0.09  (.07)** 
-0.08  (.03)** 
-0.14  (.02)** 
-0.08  (.02)** 
0.01 (.03) 
-0.02  (.02) 
-0.03  (.02) 
-0.03  (.02) 
-0.03  (.02) 
-0.04  (.03) 
-0.10  (.03)** 
-0.05  (.02)** 
-1.9 
0.49 
Note: All standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
#Significant at the 10 percent level. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 1 percent level. 
in question; this enables us to examine whether the trends in trade commonly 
attributed to changes in preferential arrangements in these periods were in fact 
already evident in prior years. 
6.3  Results 
We estimate both the traditional gravity model and our alternative specifica- 
tion over the entire three-decade period. For the traditional model, estimation 
runs from  1954-56  to  1990-92,  while for the first-difference specification 
it runs from  1957-59  to  1990-92  (the first period being used  in data con- 
struction). 
Table 6.1 reports the coefficients on the product of real GDPs, population, 
the real exchange rate, and, in the case of the traditional model, distance and 
the constant term, as well as dummy variables for each three-year period. The 
behavioral variables are correctly signed, highly significant, and plausible in 147  Is Regionalism Simply a Diversion? 
magnitude. In  the traditional model, the coefficient on the gravity term  is 
around 1.4. Since that term is the product of  the two countries' GDPs, this 
implies an elasticity of trade with respect to changes in GDP of 3, consistent 
with the tendency for trade to grow faster than income over the postwar pe- 
ri~d.~  At -0.66,  the coefficient on the product of the populations implies elas- 
ticities on both the product of GDP and the product of GDP per capita of two- 
thirds. The coefficient on the deviation of the exchange rate from PPP is 0.58, 
about half the value of the gravity coefficient. This implies that both measures 
of relative GDP-at  PPP exchange rates and at current exchange rates-matter 
for trade. The coefficient on distance implies that each percentage point in- 
crease in that variable reduces trade by 0.77 percent.'O 
The coefficients on the behavioral variables in the first-difference formula- 
tion are broadly similar to those in the traditional model, although their preci- 
sion, as measured by  the standard errors, is lower. The differenced specifica- 
tion gives rather more weight to per capita as opposed to aggregate GDP. The 
coefficient on the change in the real exchange rate against the dollar is also 
somewhat smaller. At  significantly less than 0.5, it implies a role for third- 
country effects in the determination of bilateral trade. 
The coefficients on  dummy  variables  for each period  from  1957-59  to 
1990-92 are also reported. In the traditional model they imply that the constant 
in  1990-92  is  1.49 below the corresponding constant term in  1954-56,  re- 
flecting the steady downward trend of the constant over time. Apparently, the 
estimated coefficients on the behavioral variables overstate the growth in trade, 
other variables held constant, requiring a compensating fall in the constant, 
This reduction in the constant implies a 4.1 percent per annum fall in real trade 
after controlling for the other determinants featured in the standard gravity 
formulation, which  seems implausibly large-too  large, that  is,  to be  ex- 
plained by differences in the growth of the implicit deflators for trade and for 
overall GDP."  This points to the likelihood of model misspecification. 
The results of estimating the constant terms in the first-difference formula- 
tion are also reported in table 6.1. The standard errors of  the coefficients on 
the time-specific constants are significantly smaller than in the traditional for- 
mulation, a result that carries over when dummy variables for trade blocs are 
added (see below). While most of the time-specific constants are still negative, 
9. For those, including ourselves, who regard this elasticity as implausibly large, this may be 
evidence of model misspecification. We return to this possibility below. Further evidence on the 
relationship between trade and growth in the industrial countries after World War I1 is provided 
by Irwin (1995). 
10. Experimentation with alternative formulations of the distance variable, such as adding the 
square and cube of the logarithm of distance or including the absolute value of distance rather than 
its logarithm, produced some discernible changes in the estimated effect of distance. However, 
none of these alternative formulations significantly altered the coefficients on the other variables 
in the model. 
11. Recall that the volume trade of trade is calculated using the GDP deflator for the United 
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Table 6.2  Results from "Rate of Change" Gravity Model over Different Periods 
Variable  1956-73  1966-80  1975-92 
Change in GDP at PPP 
Change in population 
Change in real exchange rate 















-0.45  (.25)' 
0.36 (.09)** 
-0.19  (.06)** 
-0.15  (.06)** 
-0.18  (.06)** 
-0.28  (.05)** 
-0.25  (.06)** 
-0.13  (.06)* 
1.29 (.11)** 
-1.56  (.31)** 
0.44 (.05)** 
-0.15  (.05)**" 
0.03 (.06Y 
0.00 (.05) 
-0.04  (.04) 
-0.08  (.04)* 
0.95 (.09)** 
-0.77  (.29)** 
0.30 (.05)** 
-0.03  (.05) 
0.03 (.04) 
-0.03  (.04) 
-0.03  (.04) 
-0.07  (.04)' 
-0.06  (.03)* 
Note:  All standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
"Period is one year later than indicated. 
'Significant at the 10 percent level. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 1 percent level. 
the implied fall in real trade over the period, at  1.5 percent per annum, is 
smaller than that suggested by  the traditional formulation. There is a break 
around 1970, the constant terms being negative and significant prior to this but 
small and insignificant subsequently. This suggests a change in the relationship 
between trade and growth around the time of  the breakdown of  the Bretton 
Woods system and the New Protectionism that accompanied the slowdown in 
industrial country growth. 
Table 6.2 shows corresponding results for the first-difference specification 
distinguishing the three periods on which we focus in  the remainder of  the 
paper: 1956-73,  1966-80, and 1975-92.  (These regressions add dummy vari- 
ables to capture the impact of free trade agreements.) The coefficients on the 
behavioral variables are correctly signed for each subperiod. There is some 
evidence of  a decline over time in the tendency for the growth of  trade to 
outstrip the growth of  income, consistent with the idea that trade has been 
catching up to its potential level following the tariff warfare of the 1930s and 
the Great Depression. The coefficient on population growth is less well deter- 
mined, presumably reflecting limited variation in the growth of population over 
time. The coefficient on the real exchange rate is uniformly large and signifi- 
cant. While its value differs from period to period, there is some evidence on 
balance that third-country effects are important for bilateral trade flows. The 149  Is Regionalism Simply a Diversion? 
constant terms follow the pattern  observed in  the regression for the  entire 
sample. 
6.3.1 
Capturing  the  effects  of  preferential  arrangements  involves  including 
dummy variables. For the regression covering the 1956-73  period, five dum- 
mies associated with the EEC and EFTA were added. These measure trade 
within the EEC,'* trade within EFTA,13 trade between the EEC and ERA, 
trade between the EEC and other industrial countries, and trade between EFTA 
and other industrial countries. Each dummy is then multiplied by the relevant 
time-specific constant terms to differentiate the impact of preferential arrange- 
ments over time. 
Consider first the results for the six founding members (EC6) of the EEC. 
There is little evidence in table 6.3 that trade among the Six was already in- 
creasing faster in the second half of the 1950s (prior to the founding of the 
EEC) than predicted by the arguments of the gravity model. The coefficient on 
the dummy variable representing trade among future EEC members, at 0.02 
for 1956-58, is statistically insignificant. As the equation is in logarithms, this 
implies that trade among the six future members of the Community grew by a 
total of just 2 percent more between 1953-55  and 1956-58  than would have 
been predicted by their economic characteristics and the average behavior of 
countries in the sample. The coefficient for 1959-61,  immediately after the 
founding of the EEC, is five times as large and significant at the 10 percent 
level. This contradicts widespread skepticism about the trade-creating effects 
of the EEC, commonly expressed on the grounds that long-standing economic 
ties and the legacy of prior regional initiatives like the European Payments 
Union and the European Coal and Steel Community (whose membership was 
coincident with the Six) caused these countries to trade disproportionately with 
one another not because of their nascent customs union but due to other, unob- 
servable characteristics correlated with and spuriously attributed to EEC mem- 
bership. Our results suggest that insofar as those unobservable characteristics 
were constant between 1956-58 and 1959-61, they cannot explain the increas- 
ing tendency for the  six countries to trade with one another following the 
founding of the Community. Other potential explanations of this differential 
increase in trade, such as a beneficial trade structure (e.g., the income elasticity 
of trade in manufactures may be higher than the corresponding elasticity for 
primary goods), would also still have to explain why these effects would be so 
much smaller immediately prior to the formation of the EEC than they were 
immediately after. 
The coefficient on intra-EEC trade remains large and significant through 
The Formation of the EEC and EFTA 
12. Comprising BelgiudLuxembourg, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany. 
13. Comprising, over this period, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Noway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom. Iceland and Liechtenstein were also members but were excluded from 
the estimation due to their small size. Table 6.3  Effects of European Free Trade Agreements: 1956-73 
Implied Accumulated 
Variable  195  6-5  8  1959-61  1962-64  1965-67  1968-70  1971-73  Percentage per Annurn 
~~ 
EC6 with itself  .02 (.06)  .I1 (.06)#  .I1 (.07)*  .15 (.04)**  .I3 (.05)**  .04 (.04)  3.2** 
EFTA7 with itself  .01 (.06)  .02 (.06)  .01 (.06)  .I6  (.04)**  .21 (.05)**  .02 (.05)  2.3** 
EC6 with EFTA7  .02 (.06)  -.09  (.06)  -.I0 (.06)  -.02  (.03)  -  .02 (.03)  -  .05 (.04)  -IS* 
With other industrialized countries 
EC6  -.03 (.06)  -.I1  (.06)'  -.08 (.07)  .02 (.04)  -  .06 (.04)  -.05  (.04)  -  1.7* 
ERA7  -.OO  (.07)  -.I1  (.06)'  -.06 (.06)  .08 (.My  .02 (.W)  .02 (.04)  -0.8 
Notes: EC6 comprises BelgiumKuxembourg, France, Italy, the  Netherlands, and West Germany. ERA7 comprises Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom over this period. Other members of EFTA at the time, but not  included in the estimation, are Iceland and 
Liechtenstein.  All standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
#Significant at the 10 percent level. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 1 percent level. 151  Is Regionalism Simply a Diversion? 
1970 before fading in  1971-73.  As reported in the last column of the table, 
these estimates imply that trade among the Six grew 3.2 percent per annum 
faster than can be explained by  their observable economic characteristics and 
the average behavior of countries over the full 1953-73  ~amp1e.I~ 
The next row focuses on the experience of  the members EFTA  (EFTA7). 
Although the Stockholm Convention founding EFTA was signed in 1960, the 
free trade area only came into operation in 1965. Again, we find evidence that 
the agreement caused trade among the participating countries to expand sig- 
nificantly. Up to 1964 the growth of trade between EFTA members was within 
1 or 2 percent of the rate predicted by the gravity model. After the free trade 
area came into operation, however, trade within EFTA expanded faster than 
otherwise explicable, the cumulative increase reaching 45 percent by  1970. 
The growth of  intra-EFTA trade then reverted to the levels predicted by  the 
model. But since the model is in differences, the impact on the volume of trade 
of  the creation of  EFTA  does not disappear in the 1970s and subsequently. 
Over the entire period, trade between members of EFTA is estimated to have 
expanded at a highly significant 2.3 percent per annum faster than predicted 
by the standard gravity variables, with nearly the entire spurt occumng in the 
late 1960s. 
The next row of table 6.3 shows the behavior of trade between the EEC and 
EFTA. After growing unexceptionally before  1959, trade between  the two 
blocs fell in the five years following the formation of the EEC, the cumulated 
decline reaching exp(-.19)  = -17  percent. Since EFTA did not come into 
operation until  1965, it seems reasonable to attribute this contraction to the 
formation of the EEC. The estimated coefficients on this variable remain nega- 
tive after 1965, indicating a continued reduction in EEC-EFTA trade relative 
to what might be expected. However, the sizes of the coefficients decline after 
1965, the implied reduction in the growth of trade per annum being only about 
one-third the earlier rate. Over the entire period, the growth of  trade is  1.5 
percent per annum slower than is explicable in terms of the other observable 
characteristics of the countries involved. 
The last two rows of table 6.3 report coefficients on dummy variables repre- 
senting trade between the EEC and EFTA on the one hand and the remaining 
industrial countries on the other. For the EEC, where all but one of the esti- 
mated coefficients are negative, there is some evidence of trade diversion. But 
of the individual coefficients, only that for 1959-61,  the period immediately 
after the formation of the EEC, differs significantly from zero (at the 10 per- 
cent level). For the period as a whole, trade between the EEC and industrial 
countries that were not members of  the EEC or EFTA fell at a statistically 
14. This value was calculated by an ancillary regression in which the EEC and EFTA dummy 
variables were included without time-specific dummies, which is equivalent to measuring the dif- 
ferential expansion in trade over the entire period. This is why the value is accompanied by an 
estimate of its statistical significance. 152  Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen 
Table 6.4  Industrial Country Trade Patterns for the EEC and EFTA, 195670 
(percentage  of trade with industrial countries) 








Implied growth per annum in overall trade 
With all industrialized countries  0.52 
Considering just EC6  1.41 
Trade creation ratio  0.37 
EFTA7 with 
EFTA7  27.1 
EC6  36.4 
Other industrialized countries  36.5 
Implied growth per annum in overall trade 
With all industrialized countries  0.55 
Considering just EFTA7  0.62 
Trade creation ratio  0.88 
Memorandum 
Industrial country trade as a percentage of total trade 
EC6  66.3 





























significant 1.7 percent per annum relative to expectations, a reduction similar 
to that experienced by the EFTA countries themselves. 
While there was also a reduction in EFTA's  trade with the rest of the world, 
relative to what would have been predicted by the gravity model, of around 0.8 
percent per annum between 1956 and 1973, virtually all of this occurred prior 
to the creation of the free trade area in  1965. Indeed, the results indicate that 
trade with the rest of the world actually increased relative to expectations  from 
1965 to 1973. 
These results paint contrasting pictures of the early years of  the EEC and 
EFTA. Both European arrangements  promoted trade among their members. In 
the case of the EEC this appears to have been accompanied by a fall in trade 
relative to expectations with both EFTA and the remainder of  the industrial 
world, suggesting trade diversion. For EFTA the evidence of trade diversion is 
less clear. EFTA trade with both the EEC and other industrial countries grew 
only slightly slower than expected over the period as a whole. Most of  the 
reduction in both cases occurred in the early 1960s, prior to the EFTA free 
trade area's coming into operation. 
Table 6.4 reports a measure of the relative importance of trade creation and 
trade diversion. Its upper part shows the percentage of EEC trade with indus- 
trial countries destined for the EEC itself, for EFTA, and for other industrial 153  Is Regionalism Simply a Diversion? 
countries. These percentages are then combined with the expansion or contrac- 
tion of trade relative to expectations to calculate the implied increase in overall 
EEC trade. Using the trends in trade over the entire period in the last column of 
table 6.3, the overall expansion of EEC trade is estimated to have been 0.5-1.25 
percent per annum, with the estimated value rising over time as an increasing 
proportion of EEC trade remains within the Community, where trade rises at a 
trend rate of 3.2 percent per annum. Meanwhile, a declining proportion of EEC 
trade takes place with EFTA and other industrial countries. 
This calculation is then repeated, taking into account only the expansion of 
trade with other members of  the EEC. The figure that results represents the 
expansion in overall trade with industrial countries that would have occurred 
had no trade diversion taken place. The ratio of the two values represents the 
share of the expansion of intra-EEC trade that did not result in trade diversion. 
We refer to this as the “trade creation ratio.” 
Consider, for example, these calculations for 1962-64,  which can be inter- 
preted in the following way. If the 3.2 percent per annum expansion of  trade 
within the EEC had been accompanied by no decrease in trade elsewhere, trade 
with all industrial countries would have grown annually by 1.8 percent. In fact, 
it increased at little over half this rate. Hence, around half the increase in intra- 
EEC trade was offset by losses e1~ewhere.l~ 
As already noted, evidence of trade diversion is less strong for EFTA, as the 
relative decline in trade with the EEC and the rest of the world occurred largely 
prior to the formation of the free trade area in  1965. If  there was no fall in 
trade with other countries, of course, then all of  the increase in trade within 
EFTA reflects trade creation. Our calculations in table 6.4 assume that intra- 
EFTA trade rose by 2.3 percent per annum, trade with the EEC remained con- 
stant, while trade with other industrial countries (excluding members of  the 
EEC) fell by 0.8 percent per annum. On this basis, overall EFTA trade is esti- 
mated to have expanded by about 0.6 percent per annum and there is little or 
no trade diversion. 
All of these calculations refer exclusively to trade creation and trade diver- 
sion vis-8-vis industrialized countries. Table 6.4 also reports the share of trade 
with industrial countries in total trade for each group of countries and hence, 
by inference, trade with developing nations. The latter proportion declined for 
both the EEC and EFTA over the period, with a particularly large fall (from 
one-third to one-quarter) in the case of the EEC. This reduction could of course 
have reflected slower growth in this part of the world and differences in output 
elasticities between the manufacturing goods primarily produced by industrial 
countries and the primary goods more often produced by developing countries. 
Without expanding the scope of the study to include data on developing coun- 
15. This calculation involves strong assumptions. All of  the trend reduction in trade between 
the EEC and members of EFT’  is assumed to reflect trade diversion by the EEC, e.g. If some of 
the reduction in trade between the two blocs was caused by  ERA, then the estimated rate of 
increase of actual trade, and hence the share of trade creation, would be higher. 154  Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen 
tries, no definitive answer can be given to this question. But it is conceivable 
that the results could be significantly affected. For the EEC, for example, if 
trade with the developing world lagged behind its expected rate of increase by 
the same 1.7 percent per annum found for trade with other industrial countries, 
this reduces the trade creation ratio to 20 percent.16 
6.3.2  The First Enlargement 
Table 6.5 reports the dummy variable coefficients for the period  1966-80. 
The results focus on the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland, the three 
countries that joined the EEC in 1973. (The United Kingdom and Denmark 
left  EFTA,  and  several  remaining  EFTA  countries  negotiated  free  trade 
agreements with the Community at that time.) The first three rows report the 
coefficients on dummy variables for trade among the United Kingdom, Den- 
mark, and Ireland, between these three countries and the six founding members 
of the EEC, and between the United Kingdom and Denmark and the remaining 
five members of EFTA. Prior to 197  1, trade between these three countries and 
the EEC was falling, while that between the United Kingdom and Denmark on 
the one hand and the rest of EFTA on the other was rising. Trade among the 
three countries themselves shows no unusual trend. To the extent that trade 
between these countries and the founding members of the EEC expanded sub- 
sequently, this was not attributable to factors that had already caused trade 
among these countries to grow disproportionately in prior years. It should be 
noted that the trend increase in trade between the United Kingdom and Den- 
mark and the other members of  EFTA, as well as the trend decline in trade 
between the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland and the EEC, was smaller 
than the corresponding trends for the remaining members of EFTA. 
Both the EEC and the other members of  EFTA  showed pronounced in- 
creases in internal trade (3.0 percent per annum within the EEC and 6.8 percent 
between the remaining five members of  EFTA) and decreases in trade with 
each other, in line with the results for the earlier period in table 6.3. Insofar as 
these trends are less distinct for the United Kingdom and Denmark, it is pos- 
sible to identify a sense in which these future EEC members behaved differ- 
ently from the remaining EFTA countries.” 
Table 6.5 also reports results for a crumbling trade bloc: the British Com- 
monwealth.’*  Trade between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth de- 
clined at a highly significant annual rate of  4.0 percent per annum prior to 
1971. From these results it is clear that the disintegration of  preferential ar- 
16. This calculation uses 1962-64 weights. 
17. Trade between the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland and other industrial countries 
and that between the remaining members of ERA  and other industrial countries show no particu- 
lar pattern, while there is a significant fall compared to expectations in the equivalent trade for 
the EEC. 
18. As only industrial countries are considered, the Commonwealth consists of Australia, Can- 




Variable  1966-68  1969-7 1  1972-74  1975-77  1978-80  1966-71  1972-80 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland with 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland with 
United Kingdom, Denmark with EFTAS 
EC6 with itself 
EFTAS with itself 
EC6 with EFTA5 
United Kingdom with Commonwealth 
With other industrialized countries 










-  .06 (.04)# 
-.I3  (.04)** 
.01 (04) 
-.01  (.04) 
.05 (.04) 
.01 (.12) 








-.04  (.04) 
-.18  (.08)* 
.14 (.04)** 
-  .06 (.04) 
.02 (.03) 
-  .02 (.04) 
-.04  (.04) 
-.32  (.03)** 
.05 (.03) 
.01 (.03) 
-.02  (.04) 
-.09  (.14) 
.22 (.05)** 
-.04  (.06) 
.02 (.04) 
.04 (.04) 
-.02  (.05) 
-.16  (.04)** 
.03 (.04) 
.04 (04) 
-.01  (.05) 
.14 (.09) 
.I6 (.05)** 
-.01  (.05) 
.02 (.04) 
-.06  (.04) 
.07 (.04)' 




0.7  -1.5 
-1.6  5.9** 
2.8*  -1.2 
3.0**  0.5 
6.8**  -1.3 
-2.6*  0.6 
-4.0**  -6.7** 
0.0  2.6** 
-  1.8"  1  .o 
0.0  0.0 
Notes: EC6 comprises Belgiurduxemhourg, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany. EFTA5 comprises Austria, Finland, Noway, Sweden, and 
Switzerland. Iceland and Liechtenstein were also members of EFTA over this period. The Commonwealth comprises Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. 
Numerous other developing countries were also members of the Commonwealth over this period. All standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
"Significant at the 10 percent level. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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rangements can alter the direction of trade as powerfully as the formation of 
new ones. 
The results after 1972 are very different. Trade among the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, and Ireland declined after the accession of  these countries to the 
EEC, most dramatically in the immediately subsequent years. Presumably be- 
cause there existed a bilateral free trade arrangement between the United King- 
dom and Ireland and because the United Kingdom and Denmark were both 
members of EFTA, EEC membership produced no direct gain in terms of trade 
creation within this group; indeed, trade fell relative to expectations formed on 
the basis of the gravity model. This decline plausibly reflects a reorientation 
of trade from within this group to the rest of the EEC. Trade between the three 
new members and the original six expanded significantly relative to expecta- 
tions, at a rate of 5.2 percent per annum between 1972 and 1980. At the same 
time the exceptional expansion of trade among the Six came to an end. Trade 
between the United Kingdom and Denmark on the one hand and the remaining 
members of  EFTA  on the other declined after the two countries joined the 
EEC. This decline proceeded at almost exactly the same rate, however, as the 
decrease of  trade among the EFTA  countries themselves. The defection of 
the United Kingdom and Denmark, together with the signing of trade arrange- 
ments with the newly expanded EEC, appears to have created a trend decrease 
in the growth of intra-EFTA trade. However, these arrangements with the EEC 
do not appear to have  reversed the earlier trend decline in trade relative to 
expectations between the two trade blocs. Rather, trade now moved in line with 
that predicted by the model. 
Trade between the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland and the rest of 
the world grew significantly faster after  1972 than predicted by  the model. 
Whatever the barriers to trade between the EEC and the rest of the world, in 
other words, these were generally less onerous than previous arrangements in 
these countries. The exception is trade between the United Kingdom and the 
Commonwealth, whose  decline accelerated after Britain’s accession to the 
EEC; significant new impediments were apparently created in this case.I9 
Table 6.6 analyzes the degree to which the EEC’s first enlargement created 
and diverted trade. It shows the proportion of the total trade of the three new 
member states and all industrial countries directed toward one another and 
toward the original six.2o  The implied increase in overall trade is then calcu- 
lated using trends in trade from 1972 to 1980, reported in the last column of 
table 6.5. These calculations imply that between 60 and 90 percent of  new 
trade with the EEC was trade creation.*’ 
19. Trade between the original EEC countries and the remaining EFTA countries on the one 
hand and the rest of  the world on the other shows no pattern over and above that predicted by 
the model. 
20. It also considers trade between the United Kingdom and Denmark and the remaining EFTA 
members; between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth; and between the United King- 
dom, Denmark, and Ireland and other industrial countries. 
21. Again, however, there appears to be a marked decrease in the proportion of trade with 
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Table 6.6  Industrial Country lkade Patterns for the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, and Ireland: 1969-80 (percentage of trade with 
industrial countries) 
Trade Measure  1969-7  1  1978-80 
United Kingdom, Denmurk, Ireland 
With each other 
With EC6 
United Kingdom, Denmark with EFTA5 
United Kingdom with Commonwealth 
With other industrialized countries 
Implied growth per annum in overall trade: 
With all industrialized countries 
Considering just EC6 
Trade creation ratio 
16.2  14.7 
29.7  44.7 
18.8  16.3 
12.4  4.8 
22.9  19.5 
1.05  2.41 
1.75  2.64 
0.60  0.91 
Memorandum 
Industrial country trade as a percentage of total trade  69.3  74.0 
6.3.3  The Second Enlargement 
The final period considered, 1975-92,  spans the second enlargement of the 
European Community (as the EEC had by then renamed itself), Greece being 
admitted in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986. As can be seen in table 6.7, 
Greek trade with the European Community had begun to expand unusually 
rapidly as early as 1975-77;  this cautions against attributing the entire growth 
of Greece’s EC trade to the country’s admission to the Community. Greece was 
undergoing significant economic liberalization in the late 1970s,  and trade with 
the rest of the world in fact expanded even faster than trade with the Commu- 
nity between 1975 and 1977. Trade with other industrial countries then went 
into decline between 1978 and 1983, around the time of EC admission, with a 
drop relative to expectations of exp( -  .46), or 37 percent. This decline was not 
reversed subsequently. 
The growth of trade between Spain and Portugal and the European Commu- 
nity (including Greece) also accelerated prior to entry, although these increases 
became much more dramatic after 1986.22  More striking than the growth of 
Spain and Portugal’s trade with the European Community was the very rapid 
expansion of  their trade with one another. Between  1978 and 1992 the two 
countries’ bilateral trade grew by  exp( 1.79), or 599 percent more than pre- 
dicted by the model. The rapid increase in trade with other EC members was 
accomplished with little or no decrease in trade with other industrial countries. 
Clearly, this is a case where admission to the Community was strongly trade 
creating. 
Our other findings for the period of  the second enlargement are generally 
plausible. The differential expansion of  trade among the United Kingdom, 
22. As in the case of Greece, this may reflect general liberalization of the trade regime. Table 6.7  Effects of European Free Trade Agreements: 1975-92 





1975-77  1978-80  1981-83  1984-86  1987-89  1990-92  over Period 
Greece with EC9 
Spain, Portugal with each other 
Spain, Portugal with EClO 
EC6 with itself 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland 
EFTAS with itself 
EC9 with EFl'A5 
United Kingdom with Commonwealth 




United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland 
EFTA5 
with each other 
with EC6 
.06 (.03)#  .07 (.09) 
-.I7  (.04)**  .27 (.04)** 
-.08  (.04)'  .03 (.03) 
.06 (.05)  .01 (04) 
-.05  (.14)  .01 (.09) 
.26 (.05)**  .I2 (.05)* 
.04 (.05)  -.I0  (.05)* 
.06 (.05)  .04 (04) 
-.17  (.05)**  -.21  (.04)** 
.I7 (.Il)  -.23  (.08)** 
-.07  (.M)  p.09 (.05)* 
.07 (.05)  -.01  (04) 
.05  (.05)  .09 (.04)* 





-.04  (.04) 
.01 (.04) 
-.I5  (.04) 
-  .04 (.06) 
.06 (.05) 





.I2  (.03)** 
.08 (.04)" 
.I2  (.03)** 





.09  (.03)** 
.31 (.04)** 
.20 (.03)** 
.04  (.03) 
p.01 (.04) 
.06 (.03)* 
-.07  (.05) 
-  .02 (.05) 
.02 (.05) 














1  .o 
1.3' 
Notes: EC6 comprises Belgiufiuxembourg,  France, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany. EC9 adds Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom to this 
group, while EClO also includes Greece. EFTAS comprises Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Other members of ERA  at this time were 
Iceland and Liechtenstein. The Commonwealth comprises Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Numerous other developing countries were also members of 
the Commonwealth over this period. All standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
#Significant at the 10 percent level. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 6.8  Industrial Country Trade Patterns for Greece, Spain, and Portugal: 
1978-92 (percentage of trade with industrial countries) 
Trade Measure  1978-80  1984-86  1990-92 
Greece with 
EC9  70.7 
Other industrialized countries  29.3 
Implied growth per annum in overall trade 
With all blocs  0.92 
Considering just EC9  1.41 
Trade creation ratio  0.65 
Spain and Portugal wirh 
Each other  3.0 
EClO  67.4 
Other industrialized countries  29.6 
Implied growth per annum in overall trade 
With all blocs  2.10 
Considering just EClO  1.96 
Trade creation ratio  1.07 
Memorandum 
Industrial country trade as a percentage of total trade 
Greece  71.8 



























Denmark, and Ireland evident in the earlier period slowed in the 1980s,  and 
EFTA began to show signs of unraveling. While EFTA's  trade with the rest of 
the world showed some expansion in the 1980s, there was a differential decline 
in intra-EFTA trade after 1978. EFTA's trade with the European Community 
expanded, which can be interpreted in terms of EFTA's trade becoming increas- 
ingly multilateralized. Finally, the long decline in the relative importance of 
trade between the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries finally 
wound down in the mid-1980s. 
According to table 6.8, somewhere between two-thirds and three-quarters 
of  Greece's additional exports to and imports from the rest of  the European 
Community represented trade creation. Accession appears to have been super- 
trade creating for Spain and Portugal in the sense that the expansion of trade 
exceeded that implied by the increase in trade between these countries and the 
rest of the Community, a result that mainly reflects the expansion in trade be- 
tween the two countries themselves. It is also worth noting, however, the partic- 
ularly striking fall in percentage of trade with developing countries in this case. 
Overall, then, we find strong effects of preferential trade agreements on the 
pattern of  Europe's trade. Intra-EEC trade increased from the Community's 
inception in ways that cannot be attributed solely to a history of intimate trade 
relations or other unobserved characteristics of  the original six omitted from 
the  gravity model. We  find that  the EEC  stimulated the volume  of  intra- 160  Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen 
Community trade as early as 1959-61-that  is, even while its customs union 
was still being completed. That intra-EEC trade barriers were progressively 
reduced over the first half of the 1960s provides a potential explanation. This 
expansion of intra-EEC trade relative to expectations was accompanied by de- 
clines in trade with the rest of the world, implying that the EEC caused some 
trade diversion in the  1960s. We  similarly find evidence of  trade expansion 
within EFTA in its early years. The same pattern is evident in the rapid expan- 
sion of trade between the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland on the one 
hand and the original six EEC members on the other in the period following 
the first enlargement. Accession produced a pronounced rise in trade with the 
rest of the EEC, some of which reflected trade diversion, a pattern repeated 
with the entry of Greece. Only in the case of  Spain and Portugal is there no 
evidence of trade diversion. By the time they joined the Community, however, 
the exceptionally rapid growth of intra-EC trade had begun to slow, and there 
were signs of the unraveling of the ERA  bloc. 
Thus, our results confirm that preferential trade arrangements can strongly 
encourage trade and that the unraveling of such arrangements can reverse those 
effects. They paint a mixed picture of  the trade-creating and trade-diverting ef- 
fects. 
6.4  Comparisons with Other Studies and Approaches 
It is interesting to ask how our results differ from those obtained in other 
In this section we therefore compare our findings with those of previ- 
ous investigators and reestimate their specifications using our data. 
Three studies that have used gravity models to analyze the effects of  the 
EEC and EFTA  are Frankel, Stein, and Wei  (1996), Aitken (1973), and De 
Grauwe (1988). Our results closely resemble those of Aitken and De Grauwe, 
who estimate the model in level form. Aitken, considering a sample of indus- 
trial countries, found that EEC membership had a significant effect on the vol- 
ume of trade between member states starting in the 1960s. In parallel with our 
results, he turned up little evidence that membership in the European Coal and 
Steel Community had stimulated trade in the 1950s. De Grauwe considered 
bilateral trade flows among 10 industrial countries since the 1960s. He found 
that EC membership significantly increased trade among the six founding 
members in the 1960s but no longer had a discernible effect in the 1970s, a 
contrast that he attributed to increased trade diversion following the admission 
of the three new members in 1973. But he also found a strong trade-creating 
effect in the 1970s for the three new entrants themselves. Our results are con- 
sistent with his in these respects. 
Frankel et al. also estimated the gravity model in level form, using a large 
23. We confine ourselves to studies using the gravity model methodology. For results from other 
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Table 6.9  Results for EC Trade of Estimation Using the Traditional Model 
Variable  1956-73  1966-80  1975-92 
EC6 with  itself  0.64 (0.12)**  0.45 (0.11)**  -0.45  (0.13)** 
with each other  0.93 (0.24)**  -0.45  (0.13)** 
Ireland  -0.32  (0.11)**  -0.45  (0.13)** 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland 
EC6 with United Kingdom, Denmark, 
Notes; The coefficient in other dummy variables are not reported. All standard errors are adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity. 
“Significant at the 10 percent level. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 1 percent level. 
cross section of developing and industrial countries for every five years starting 
in 1965. They found that the European Community only gains significance as 
a trade-creating force in the 1980s. It is highly significant in 1985 and declines 
in importance thereafter. Their 1990 estimates suggest that if two countries are 
both EC members, their bilateral trade will be 70 percent higher than it would 
have been otherwise. Frankel et a1.k  failure to find a significant effect of the 
European Community prior to  1980 stands in contrast to table 6.3 above. They 
attributed the pre- and post-1980 difference to the accession of Greece, Spain, 
and Portugal; our results suggest that this cannot be the entire story. And in 
contrast to our results, Frankel et al. failed to identify any trade-creating effects 
of ERA. 
One reason for the difference between the results of Frankel et al. and the 
others may be that the dummy variable Frankel et al. used for the European 
Community included all 12 countries who were members in the early 1990s, 
even if they were not members during earlier periods. Hence, their earlier re- 
gressions included countries in the EC dummy that were not members of the 
Community in the relevant year. Estimating our first-difference specification 
including their dummy variable produces exactly the results found by Frankel 
et al., namely, that the “EC” showed little or no differential trade expansion in 
the 1960s and 1970s and a significant expansion in the 1980s. Hence, Frankel 
et  al. were correct in  supposing that  their results reflect  the  accession  of 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal to the European Community, but only because 
these countries were also included in the “EC” in their earlier regressions. 
We  also estimated the traditional gravity model on our data, adding dummy 
variables for preferential arrangements. To avoid a proliferation of results, table 
6.9 only reports the results for dummy variables representing the relevant core 
EC members over the three full sample periods.24  A first feature to note is that 
the standard errors on the dummy variables tend to be larger, although since 
24. Complete results on all regressions are available from the authors on request. 162  Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen 
the coefficients are also generally larger, inferences are still possible. While 
the estimates for 1956-73  and 1966-80  suggest that EC members traded sig- 
nificantly more among themselves than would be expected on the basis of their 
observable characteristics, consistent with the conclusions drawn from esti- 
mates of our first-difference model, those for the 1975-92  period suggest that 
they traded significantly less-a  difference in results that holds for the period 
for which the two samples overlap and that apparently comes from a large 
change in the estimated coefficient on income per capita in the 1975-92  regres- 
sion. These significant differences in results are consistent with our concern 
that traditional gravity models are liable to misspecificati~n.~~  By contrast, the 
results using the first-difference specification appear reasonably consistent 
across overlapping sample periods. 
6.5  Conclusions 
The increasing number of sovereign nations and consequent problems with 
global economic institutions appear to be economic facts of life at the end of 
the twentieth century. Notwithstanding the creation of the World Trade Organi- 
zation and the effort to establish commercial rules of the road at the global 
level, this gives grounds for thinking that regional economic arrangements, 
whose negotiation involves fewer transactions costs, will be the wave of  the 
future. The rise of regionalism has understandably raised the specter of exclu- 
sionary blocs and concern over the danger of trade diversion. This paper has 
asked whether there are grounds for drawing such inferences from the history 
of regionalism in Europe. 
We have found that the formation of the EEC and EFTA free trade areas had 
significant impacts on Europe’s trade that cannot be attributed to the participat- 
ing countries’ observable economic characteristics or even to unobservable 
factors, such as histories of intimate trade relations or beneficial trade struc- 
tures, whose effects remained constant over time. For the founding members, 
these trade effects were concentrated in the early years of existence of  their 
arrangements. EFTA was heavily trade creating, but the EEC promoted in- 
trabloc trade through a combination of trade creation and trade diversion. This 
conclusion is reinforced by our results for the first two enlargements of  the 
Community, for which we  also find both trade creation and trade diversion 
effects (the accession of  Portugal and Spain, by  contrast, led to little if any 
trade diversion). This is an important caution to those contemplating regional 
initiatives in Asia and other parts of the world. 
At the same time, some limitations of  the analysis should be recognized. 
25. This may  be particularly important for a region such as Europe, which includes a large 
number of  countries that are geographically close to each other by the standards of  the rest of the 
world, and hence where the distance variable may be particularly liable to misspecification. 163  Is Regionalism Simply a Diversion? 
The analytic framework takes no account of the potential impact of preferential 
trading arrangements on the growth of output in member countries or of the 
global trend to more openness to trade caused, in part, by a general postwar 
liberalization of trade. Within the methodology, several potential extensions of 
the underlying approach could also be considered. One is to differentiate trade 
in different types of products, such as food or manufactures.  In addition  to 
addressing concerns that the underlying behavioral coefficients may vary by 
type of good, distinguishing between these types of goods is of particular inter- 
est for the European community, where one particularly potent source of pro- 
tection and trade diversion has been the Common Agricultural Policy. Another 
extension would be to expand the geographical coverage to include developing 
countries, possibly while allowing these countries to have different behavioral 
coefficients. Both of these tasks are on our agenda for the future. 
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Comment  Francis T. Lui 
This is an interesting piece of work that attempts to L-termine whe ... er regional 
blocs are trade creating or trade diverting. I will comment on both the method- 
ology and the results. 
Methodology 
The paper tries to estimate a gravity model. However, when regressing vol- 
ume of trade on the product of GDP of two trading partners and on the product 
of  their populations, the paper uses growth rates rather than levels of  these 
variables. This method has two main advantages. First, unobserved and ob- 
served heterogeneity across countries that remains stable over time (such as 
cultural factors and languages) can be eliminated from the gravity equation. 
Second, economic distance, which is difficult to measure but is constant over 
time, also disappears from the equation. This procedure is therefore less vul- 
nerable to the contamination of missing factors. 
Some caution has to be taken, however. Since the growth rate rather than the 
level of  trade is used, the results should be interpreted differently from those 
in the literature. For instance, imagine that a trading bloc does have some im- 
pact on trade, but that it is a once-and-for-all increase in the level of trade. In 
this case, the growth rate of trade may remain unaffected even though the trad- 
ing bloc has some impact on the level. 
The growth rate of output (or per capita output) is treated as an explanatory 
variable. In the literature of endogenous growth, with which I am more famil- 
iar, this is universally modeled as a dependent variable. It is not hard to con- 
struct models that say that an increase in either the volume or the growth rate 
of  trade will raise the growth rate of  per capita output. The growth rates of 
trade and per capita output are both endogenous variables. The authors may 
need to use instrumental variables to do the estimation so as to avoid possible 
simultaneity biases. 
There is a class of endogenous growth models that exhibit the property of 
multiple equilibria; that is, some countries may  be caught at a zero-growth 
stagnant equilibrium trap while others grow perpetually. These two groups of 
countries respond differently to changes in the environment. The set of coun- 
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tries in the paper are all developed economies, and therefore none of them are 
likely to be in the trap. However, once the country set is enlarged, this may no 
longer be the case. Care must then be taken in the econometric implemen- 
tation. 
Results 
There are many results in the paper, but the one that deserves more attention 
seems to be the following. Immediately after the founding of the EEC, trade 
increased significantly between existing members, but this trade-creating ef- 
fect waned after 1970. Moreover, the EEC reduced trade significantly with the 
rest of the world. The effects of EFTA are similar, although less clear. Some 
remarks can be made on these results. 
Why did the impact of the EEC on the growth rate of trade gradually die 
down in the 1970s? One possible answer is that the growth rate of trade was 
different from the level of trade. Assume that the EEC could raise the level, 
but not the growth rate. Then the apparent increase in growth rate in the begin- 
ning was only an illusion of transitional dynamics. Once the level had gone 
up, no more change in the growth rate was observed. 
Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1996), who used a level gravity model, found that 
regionalism did not have significant impact until around 1980. The timing of 
the impact was different from that found by Bayoumi and Eichengreen. There 
are several plausible explanations: (1) The sample periods are different. (2) 
Frankel et al. used a data set that includes developing countries. (3) One model 
employs the level gravity model while the other uses the growth rate (or first- 
difference) model. (4)  There may  be  simultaneity bias  in  the growth rate 
model. The authors seem to believe that item 2 is the explanation. While this 
may  well be  the case, further investigation seems to be necessary before a 
clearer answer is available. 
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Comment  Chong-Hyun Nam 
This is an excellent piece of  empirical work.  In  this paper,  objectives are 
clearly stated, methodologies are carefully designed, and estimation results are 
interpreted with the utmost care. The findings and conclusions of  the study 
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also look very convincing because they are based on a rich data set that has 
been accumulated over the past 40 years of  experience with  the European 
Community and EFTA. 
The highlight of the study is the finding that the creation of the European 
Community in the  1950s and the creation of  EFTA  in the 1960s did in fact 
alter the pattern of trade in a significant way. The impact of  these blocs on 
trade creation and trade diversion turned out to be substantially greater than 
generally expected. 
I have a few brief comments on the paper: the first two concern the structure 
of the estimated equations, and the last is about the implications of the estima- 
tion results. 
First of all, I am a little uneasy about the theoretical foundation of  gravity 
models to explain trade flows between countries. Although this study pursues 
a  variation  on  the  conventional  type  of  gravity  model  by  taking  a  first- 
difference form in variables, the estimated equations are still based on the as- 
sumption that large and rich countries should trade more than small and poor 
countries. One can justify this kind of  assumption if  all bilateral trade flows 
represent an intraindustry type of trade with differentiated products. But I won- 
der whether that is true and whether one can safely ignore country differences 
in factor endowments or changes in them as determinants of bilateral trade 
flows. To  the extent that these omitted variables are important, the gravity 
model suffers from misspecification. Such misspecification may be responsi- 
ble for the unrealistically high value for the estimate of income elasticity of 
trade, at nearly 3. 
Second, I think it is an important deviation from ordinary gravity models to 
include a price variable like real exchange rates of the countries concerned vis- 
A-vis the United States as an explanatory variable for trade flows. But the po- 
tential contribution of this relative price variable in explaining trade flows is 
limited to effects through third countries. This is because imports and exports 
enter symmetrically in the estimating equations as a dependent variable. I feel 
uneasy about this symmetry assumption and think a test is needed to justify 
it empirically. 
Finally, although the gravity model lacks a strong theoretical foundation, it 
has long been recognized for its consistently high explanatory power with re- 
gard to trade flows between countries. So I do have much faith in the estimates 
of trade creation and trade diversion effects found in the study. According to 
the estimation results, there were in fact significant trade creation and trade 
diversion effects, though they were heavily concentrated within the few years 
immediately after the formation of the European Community and EFTA. The 
trade effects due to the accession of the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ire- 
land to the Community in 1972 proved more dramatic. For 1966-71, the annual 
growth rate of trade between these three countries and the European Commu- 
nity was 1.6 percentage points lower than could be explained by  their observ- 167  Is Regionalism Simply a Diversion? 
able economic characteristics, but for 1972-80,  it was 5.9 percentage points 
higher than the expected value. 
These are important findings, particularly for countries who may be conte- 
mplating joining an  existing trade bloc or forming a new one, possibly inciting 
them to rush to do so. It is unfortunate, however, that the study did not (or 
could not) include developing countries in its sample data. Certainly, it would 
be worthwhile to examine the trade impact of  EC formation on developing 
countries as soon as data permit. This Page Intentionally Left Blank